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EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF 
INDIVIDUALISED EMPLOYMENT 
Gordon Anderson* 
On 7 August 2007, Gordon Anderson delivered his inaugural lecture after becoming a professor in 
the Law Faculty of Victoria University of Wellington. Gordon took as his theme the protection of 
employees employed on an individual contract of employment. Following the repeal of the award 
system by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 the majority of New Zealand employees ceased to be 
covered by collectively negotiated instruments. Instead the contract of employment became 
dominant. The lecture argued that the common law contract of employment provides little 
protection for employees. Instead protection depends on some critical statutory interventions that 
provide a degree of balance within the employment relationship. While not perfect, these protections 
may be the best that can be expected in the real world of employment. 
It is a great privilege to be able to address such a distinguished audience this evening. This is 
particularly so if you are one of those who recalls the warning of one former Minister of Labour that 
my "assertions stray into the domain of the wild and erratic."1 It is also a privilege to give this 
lecture in a university with a strong tradition of scholarship in labour law and industrial relations. 
As early as 1941 the University appointed AEC Hare as the fellow in "social relations in 
industry". Rachel Barrowman reports that although Hare published a significant study, Industrial 
Relations in New Zealand:2  
Employers thought he was a stooge of the Labour government, while trade unions were suspicious of the 
university; the Department of Labour was resentful and obstructive, seeing the very fact of his 
investigation as implied criticism. He was subject to personal attacks in the press and Parliament3 
  
*  Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. This paper has been slightly modified from the lecture, 
mainly by the addition of footnotes and references. 
1  Honourable W F Birch, Minister of Labour "Correspondence" [1992] ELB 7. 
2  AEC Hare Report on Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 
1946). 
3  Rachel Barrowman Victoria University of Wellington 1899 - 1999 A History (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1999) 64. 
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The study of what was then industrial law was established at Victoria by two distinguished 
scholars, Professors Don Mathieson and Alexander Szakats.4  
While Professor Mathieson departed academia at a relatively early age for a career at the bar 
Professor Szakats followed the opposite path. Commencing his academic career at a relatively late 
age of 50 the redoubtable Professor Szakats produced his major work in his 60s and early 70s.5  
I would also like to acknowledge the staff of the Industrial Relations Centre,6 with whom I 
worked closely for many years. In its heyday this Centre was the incubator for a generation of 
leading academics of whom two I worked closely with are here this evening – Professor Pat Walsh 
and Professor Peter Brosnan.7 The Centre provided the catalyst for an enviable range of scholarship 
and made a significant contribution to policy debate through the turbulent years from the 1970s to 
the 1990s. 
I also acknowledge my debt to two of my academic collaborators and colleagues, John Hughes 
of the Law School at the University of Canterbury, my own alma mater, and Paul Roth at Otago.8 
I THE MODERN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
This evening's lecture is entitled "Employment Rights in an Era of Individualised Employment". 
The theme I wish to address is whether current employment law adequately protects the legitimate 
employment expectations of employees employed in an individual employment relationship.  
I first discuss what employee expectations might be. I then turn to the role of the common law 
contract of employment, the contract that is central to an individual employment relationship. 
Finally I consider how statutory interventions, most notably personal grievance rights and the duty 
of good faith, have impacted on the employment relationship. 
  
4  The major texts by each were D L Mathieson Industrial Law in New Zealand (Sweet and Maxwell, 
Wellington, 1970) and A Szakats Law of Employment (Butterworths, Wellington, 1975). Professor Szakats 
was also, for 15 years, the editor of what was then entitled Mazengarb's Industrial Relations and Industrial 
Law in New Zealand (looseleaf, Butterworths, Wellington). 
5  Professor Szakats died in 2001. For an obituary see Martin Vrankin "Alexander (Sandor) Szakats: A 
Tribute" (2001) 32 VUWLR 627. 
6  The Centre was established in 1970, its first Director being Professor FJL Young. 
7  See for example G Anderson, P Brosnan and P Walsh "Flexibility, Casualization and Externalization in the 
New Zealand Workforce" (1994) 36 Journal of Industrial Relations 491. Professor Walsh is currently Vice-
Chancellor at Victoria University of Wellington. Emeritus Professor Brosnan retired as Professor of 
Industrial Relations at Griffith University in 2004.  
8  This collaboration particularly relates to Mazengarb's Employment Law (looseleaf, LexisNexis, Wellington) 
5 volumes [Mazengarb] and Personal Grievances (looseleaf, LexisNexis, Wellington). 
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As I hope will become apparent the common law has been reluctant to recognise anything other 
than a minimal employee stake in employment. Wider recognition has almost always required 
legislative intervention. 
The answer to the question "why do people work?" is fairly obvious. The more relevant question 
is whether those members of society who must sell their time, effort or skill in return for a wage or 
salary have legitimate employment-based expectations that are deserving of legal protection? 
Historically employment law has more than adequately met the expectations of employers. It 
continues to do so. What it has not done until recently is balance the expectations of employers with 
those of employees. 
In the real world employers must build stable and skilled workforces and to do so must make 
considerable investments in recruitment and training. They must find labour in real labour markets 
and must adjust to the reality that valuable employees will take advantage of such markets. There is 
probably no ideal world where employers can find a pool of appropriately skilled labour available at 
the lowest possible price and where they can unilaterally control a loyal labour force and unilaterally 
dismiss it. Somewhere between these worlds however there developed a set of values based around 
strong property rights and a commodity oriented view of labour. It is a perspective with deep 
historical roots, reinforced by economists and accountants, and it has strongly influenced the law. 
Employees have a different perspective. Employees may work for a wage but do not expect to 
be treated as commodities. They expect to be treated with regard for their safety and health and for 
recognition to be given to their economic security and to the investment they make in employment. 
They expect to participate in determining their conditions of employment, to be involved in 
workplace governance, and to be consulted if their economic future is threatened. Democratic values 
and democratic citizenship are incompatible with the belief that labour is a commodity. 
An employment relationship in a modern democratic society needs to recognise that employees, 
as well as employers, take risks in an employment relationship and that the simplistic property-
contract divide of the common law cannot adequately regulate long term relationships where both 
parties make a significant investment.9 
In an employment relationship each party risks the other engaging in opportunistic behaviour. 
Employers may find that employees fail to demonstrate their claimed competence or that they 
jeopardise the employers' proprietary information. Employees risk pre-employment promises not 
equating to post-employment realities or their personal and economic security being compromised 
by incompetent management or unjustifiable decisions.  
  
9  For a union perspective on this point see Andrew Little "Employment Risk: Whose is it?" (speech to the 
Institute of Directors, Northern Branch, 27 July 2006) available at www.epmu.org.nz (accessed 14 August 
2007). 
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And increasingly a significant risk faced by employees is the risk to their educational, 
reputational and intellectual capital, often developed at considerable financial cost before and 
increasingly during employment. An employee dismissed without credible justification may find 
their reputation compromised, their educational qualifications devalued, and their employability 
undermined.  
Finally, every employment relationship must look to that third force inserting itself into the 
fissures of the relationship. Every form of labour market from slavery to the modern employment 
relationship requires the support and authority of the state. Since time immemorial, or at least 
shortly thereafter, the English state has attempted to legislate to control labour markets.10  
In modern societies it is inevitable that employment relationships are tripartite. State 
interventions are a response to political and economic pressures and reflect the investment and the 
liabilities of the social democratic state. The state educates and trains much of the labour force. The 
state supports those who have fallen out of the active labour force – whether through injury, 
dismissal or retirement. And the state ensures industrial peace and limits the potential social and 
economic harm that can result from unstable industrial relations.  
The dilemma that these competing interests pose for labour law was summarised by Hugh 
Collins:11 
Employment law … regulates employment relations for two principal purposes: to ensure that they 
function successfully as market transactions, and at the same time, to protect workers against the 
economic logic of the commodification of labour. 
Collins makes the point that any resolution of this dilemma will be complex and contested, a 
point abundantly demonstrated by the often intemperate debate in New Zealand over the last three 
decades.  
II THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
When I first arrived at this University three decades ago a lecture on individual employment 
would have consisted of little more than an uninteresting summary of some English common law 
rules and that perennial legal favourite – who is a "worker"? We had better things to discuss. It was 
the heyday of the Muldoon government's anti-union campaign. 
So what changed in the last three decades?  
One change has been a burgeoning of scholarship triggered by the growth of non-union, 
individualised employment and by the enactment of statutory protections for individual employees, 
  
10  Systematic attempts can be dated from the Ordinance of Labourers 1349. 
11  Hugh Collins Employment Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 5. 
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most notably against unfair dismissal. I will mention only a few recent contributions as illustrative 
of a generation of scholarship. One is the original and extensive analysis of the modern contract of 
employment in Professor Mark Freedland's book The Personal Employment Contract.12 A second is 
Professor Simon Deakin and Dr Frank Wilkinson's analysis of the historical origins and nature of 
the modern employment relationship in The Law of the Labour Market.13 Outside Britain 
contributions include Dr Joellen Riley's recent book Employee Protection at Common Law14 
examining the law in an Australian context, the work of Professor Katherine Stone in the United 
States on the evolution of employment relationships in modern economies15 and that of Professor 
Judy Fudge in Canada.16 
This body of scholarship is characterised by its strong historical, industrial relations, economic 
and political perspective. The reasons for a multi-disciplinary focus were made clear by a pioneer of 
labour law scholarship. Professor Otto Kahn-Freund commenced his 1972 Hamlyn Lectures, Labour 
and the Law, with the statement that "Labour law is a technique for the regulation of social 
power".17 He went on to make the point that while the law might support, restrain and even create 
power, the law itself is not the source of social power.  
Kahn-Freund recognised that in the workplace social and economic power manifests itself 
obviously and directly. He argued that the principal function of labour law is to act as a 
countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power inherent in the employment 
relationship.18 
The practical reality of social power became increasingly manifest over the last three decades as 
the result of a fundamental realignment of economic and political power within the labour market. 
Changing patterns of employment led to a significant drop in union density, and hence collective 
bargaining. Individualised employment has become increasingly dominant. In the United Kingdom, 
  
12  Mark Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). 
13  Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and 
Legal Evolution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
14  Joellen Riley Employee Protection at Common Law (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2005). 
15  Katherine Stone From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 
16  See for example Judy Fudge "The Spectre of Addis in Contracts of Employment in Canada and the UK" 
(2007) 36 ILJ 51. This issue of the ILJ (Issue 1) contain a series of articles discussing the contract of 
employment. 
17  Otto Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (Stevens, London, 1972) 4. 
18  Ibid 8. 
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Australia and New Zealand, this trend was exacerbated by a political environment openly hostile to 
trade unions and collective bargaining.19 
The effects were spectacular in New Zealand. In the mid-1980s, towards the end of the 
arbitration era, probably two-thirds of employees were covered by some form of collectively 
negotiated instrument, be it an award or its public sector equivalent.20 The Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 changed that picture rapidly and dramatically. Today, after seven years of a supposedly 
union-friendly Act, collective agreements cover only 20 percent of workers and just 9 percent in the 
private sector. There has been a total reversal of the situation of two decades ago.21 Today 80 
percent of New Zealand employees are employed wholly on individual contracts of employment.  
It is useful to recall two fundamental protections provided by the award system and to consider 
whether contemporary law is able to provide equivalent protection. First, the system ensured that 
detailed conditions of employment – remuneration, hours of work, rest periods, sick leave and so on 
– were determined collectively. Today protections once provided by agreement have typically been 
displaced by open-ended, employer discretions, often having limited legal force. The second 
protection was an effective voice in the administration of the employment relationship. Whatever 
the failings of compulsory union membership it provided rapid access to union expertise that limited 
potential managerial opportunism and promoted the effective enforcement of the legal rights of 
employees.  
III CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYMENT 
In 1991 the deluge of the Employment Contracts Act swept away the few regulated trees that 
had escaped the Labour chainsaw, most obviously the arbitration system. Exposed by the flood were 
the contractual roots of employment long concealed by the forest of arbitration.22 But roots, seen in 
the distance through dark blue glasses, can be misleading. 
  
19  For a discussion of developments in all three countries see Stephen Deery and Richard Mitchell (eds) 
Employment Relations: Individualisation and Union Exclusion. An International Study (Federation Press, 
Melbourne, 1999). 
20  Harbridge and Hince estimated union density at 73 per cent in 1989. That figure under-represents 
bargaining coverage as that depended on being within the coverage clause of an award, not on union 
membership. Raymond Harbridge and Kevin Hince "Organising Workers: The Effect of the Act on Union 
Membership and Organisation" in Raymond Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts New Zealand 
Experiences (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 224, 228. 
21  Leda Blackwood, Goldie Feinburg-Danieli, George Lafferty and Peter Kiely Employment Agreements: 
Bargaining Trends and Employment Law Update 2005/2006 (Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 2006) 16-17. 
22  Legally all employees entered into a contract of employment but in practice it was rendered largely 
irrelevant due to the detailed nature of awards. Awards were a statutory instrument and enforceable as such.  
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The more extreme proponents of labour market reform had a simple vision of what should 
replace the award system – the law of contract. Central to new-right's mythical chimera of "freedom 
of contract" was the belief that workers are a commodity. "While people are not commodities", they 
argue, "the labour services they provide … most certainly are",23 a theoretical separation likely to 
appeal only to Chicago economists and Cartesian dualists. 
Roger Kerr of the Business Roundtable summed up the desired new order:24 
The conclusion reached in New Zealand by many business and employer organisations, government 
officials and the government which was elected in December 1990 was that employment relationships 
should, by and large, be regulated by ordinary contract law. 
However as Kerr realised, and condemned, the ECA did not introduce the pure contractual 
model.25 The minimum wage was not abolished, health and safety requirements were not left to be 
negotiated by individual contracts. Discrimination law was not repealed to allow the market to 
promote equality more effectively – something it had failed to achieve over many years before the 
1970s.  
And to the particular chagrin of the new-right, protection from unjustified dismissal was not 
only retained but extended to all employees.  
It is hardly surprising that the simplistic contractual model of neo-classical theory was not 
imposed. To have done so would have been politically untenable even in 1991. Instead the 
government focused on the more pragmatic strategy of de-unionising and individualising 
employment relationships.26 
The contract of employment, instead of being largely the gateway to award coverage, became 
the legal heart of the employment relationship. The contract of employment is not however a 
simplistic classical contract. It is a highly sophisticated and developed legal instrument. 
In A Theory of Employment Systems, David Marsden suggests that the rise of the modern 
business enterprise is based on two great innovations.27 The significance of the first, limited 
liability for companies, is generally well understood. The role played by the second innovation, the 
  
23  Roger Kerr "Successes and Failures of Labour Market Reform in New Zealand" (paper delivered to Dublin 
Economic Workshop, 16 October 1999) 5, available at www.nzbr.org.nz (accessed 14 August 2007). 
24  Ibid 6-7. 
25  Ibid 9-10. 
26  See Gordon Anderson "Individualising the Employment Relationship in New Zealand: An Analysis of 
Legal Developments" in Deery and Mitchell, above n 19. 
27  David Marsden A Theory of Employment Systems: Microfoundations of Societal Diversity (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999) 3. 
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employment relationship, or more accurately in legal terms, the contract of employment, much less 
so.  
To appreciate its importance it is necessary to consider the legal context in 1875. In that year the 
British Parliament repealed two pillars that had dominated labour law since the eighteenth century, 
the Master and Servants Act and the law of criminal conspiracy as it applied to trade disputes. 
Before 1875 the discipline of labour was ensured through the use of coercive criminal sanctions.28 
Moves towards genuine parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage, together with the 
increasing influence of trade unions, meant that a system based on criminal law ceased to be 
tenable.  
It was to filling the resultant lacunae that the common law judges turned their inventive, if not 
disinterested, minds. Developing a two part strategy they sought to ensure the natural order 
continued to prevail. The law of tort was rapidly evolved to deploy against collective activity. As 
the Webbs put it "what could no longer be punished by imprisonment might at any rate be penalised 
by heavy damages and costs."29 Fortunately the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 
largely spared New Zealand the industrial and political fallout from these developments.30 
The second creation was the contract of employment – essentially the reformulation of the long 
established common law rules of master and servant in contractual guise. Deakin and Wilkinson 
describe the process as "the assimilation by the common law of a hierarchical, disciplinary model of 
service".31 
This innovation was remarkably successful for two quite different reasons. 
First, it provided the legal vehicle to ensure the perpetuation of ownership control of labour. In 
particular it provided the limited liability company, itself an innovation of the mid-nineteenth 
century, a flexible method for coordinating work within an entity based on a hierarchical 
  
28  For a detailed account of the origins and development of employment law see Deakin and Wilkinson, above 
n 13, part 2, 41 "The Origins of the Contract of Employment". In many Commonwealth countries master 
and servants acts remained important well into the last century: see Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (eds) 
Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562–1955 (Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004). The Acts seem to have had little impact in New Zealand but see Herbert Roth "The 
Historical Framework" in John Deeks and others (eds) Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Methuen, 
Wellington, 1978) 21-22 for some examples from the 1840s. 
29  Sidney and Beatrice Webb The History of Trade Unionism 1666-1943 (S&B Webb, Edinburgh, 1920) 597. 
The conflict was resolved by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 (UK). 
30  The economic torts briefly reared their head in the 1970s and 1980s: see Gordon Anderson "The Reception 
of the Economic Torts into New Zealand Labour Law: A Preliminary Discussion" (1987) 12 NZJIR 89. The 
Labour Relations Act 1987 defined a "lawful" strike for the first time. Since that reform a common law 
action in tort is only available if a strike is not lawful. 
31  Deakin and Wilkinson, above n 13, 107. 
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management structure and a centrally directed, vertically integrated production mode. The 
indeterminate nature of the contract allowed an employer to build a stable but flexible labour force 
available to work as required on changing tasks. The practical success of the contract of 
employment resulted in a largely homogenous form of employment. From about the end of the First 
World War this provided governments with a legal mechanism through which they could 
increasingly link the protections and demands of the modern social democratic state to the 
workplace and to the individual employee. This process further encouraged a common form of 
employment status – the modern "employee".32 
To return to 1875. The common law judges faced a dilemma summarised by Alan Fox.33  
Since no employment contract could anticipate all relevant contingencies … the damaging implication 
of pure contract for the employer would have been that it could not allow him to be the sole judge of 
whether his rules were arbitrary or exceed the scope of his authority … It followed that contract as the 
pure doctrine defined it could not be seen by the property-owning classes as an adequate foundation for 
governing the employment relation. 
The common law responded by developing a legal template that automatically embedded the 
interests of the employing entity at the point the contract was entered into. Fully developed this 
template allows an employment contract to be agreed on only the most minimal terms – essentially a 
wage and a basic job description. The other elements required by the employer are already in place. 
The contractual device used to achieve this was the implied term, which to quote one judge is "a 
term which the law will imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual 
relationship".34 Such terms owes nothing to the agreement of the parties and everything to the 
judicial perspective of what is "necessary." The employee will often not even be aware of their 
existence let alone their implications. 
I will briefly summarise the core terms to make their importance clear.35 
First employees must obey all reasonable orders – essentially orders that fall within the 
employee's contractual obligations, usually broadly drafted by the employer, and which are not 
otherwise unlawful. This obligation can be surprisingly open-ended. In one English case school 
teachers were informed that they must perform any duties that the community might expect of 
  
32  Ibid 105-109. 
33  Alan Fox Beyond Contract, Work, Power and Trust Relations (Allen & Unwin, London, 1974) 184. 
34  Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] 4 All ER 563, 571 (HL) Lord Bridge. 
35  For a full account refer to Mazengarb above n 8, para 1019 and following. 
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school teachers, a decision issued during a dispute where some of those duties were hotly 
contested.36 
This term is central to the business enterprise. It allows an employing entity to employ labour on 
terms that give its management broad powers to direct and control the detailed nature of the work to 
be subsequently carried out without the need to renegotiate the nature of the task or the terms under 
which it will be carried out on each occasion. Obviously such a term minimises transaction costs 
and increases the efficient use of labour. 
The second term is a duty of fidelity owed to the employer – a term carrying connotations of 
feudalism. This term fulfils two functions. It protects the employer's property, especially its 
proprietary information, by making it unlawful for an employee to use information gained in the 
course of employment for personal benefit. 
The second function is more problematic. In essence it requires an employee to give preference 
to the employers' economic interests over their own if there is any potential for a conflict of interest. 
This is so even if that conflict arises from non-work activities. An employee is of course obliged to 
work in the interest of their employer where the work in question falls within their express 
obligations. As applied however the term severely limits an employee's ability to use their skills and 
expertise for their own economic benefit. Any conflict is almost inevitably resolved in favour of the 
employer. In a recent Australian case an academic, contractually entitled to perform personal work, 
was ordered to assign independently developed intellectual property to the employer purely because 
he could have chosen to develop that property for the employer – a decision effectively negating the 
specific contractual term.37  
I am aware that not all implied terms benefit the employer. For example there is a term requiring 
the employer to provide a safe place of work that has assumed importance in recent cases involving 
stress.38 Of greater impact is the implied term of mutual trust and confidence,39 now a central 
component of the statutory duty of good faith. This term originated in Britain in the mid-1970s and 
was confirmed in New Zealand in the mid-1980s.40 Its unusual feature is that it developed in the 
context of statutory unfair dismissal law to provide the courts with a contractual basis for 
constructive dismissals. Over three decades this term has evolved to encompass a range of duties 
requiring the parties to a contract to desist from behaviours that might undermine the trust and 
  
36  Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan District Council [1986] 3 All ER 387 (Ch). 
37  Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2004] VSC 33. 
38  Attorney-General v Gilbert [2002] 2 NZLR 342 (CA). 
39  For an analysis of the development of the law see Freedland above n 12, 154-168 and the references therein. 
40  Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA) and Marlborough 
Harbour Board v Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378 (CA). 
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confidence each should have in the other. However given the wealth of pre-existing terms binding 
employees its main impact has been to constrain employer behaviours.  
Significantly however the courts have refused to apply this term to constrain an employers' most 
devastating common law power – the power to dismiss without reason.41 
The power to dismiss without reason and without consequences was the second common law 
device used to cement the pre-eminence position of the employer. Lord Reid summarised the law 
thus: "At common law a master is not bound to hear his servant before he dismisses him. He can act 
unreasonably or capriciously if he chooses but the dismissal is valid."42 
Unless there is serious misconduct the employer must give the contractual period of notice – but 
historically only a tiny minority of managerial level employees have been entitled to other than 
token notice. For most employees their employment security was effectively at the immediate will 
of the employer. Employees who challenged management or sought to assert their own rights, no 
matter how legitimately, had no remedy. No matter how egregious, discriminatory, or irrational the 
employer's decision prevailed. And regardless of the reputational and economic consequences of the 
dismissal, or the manner in which it was carried out, and no matter how foreseeable the loss, the 
employee had no legal remedy. Reinforcing this position, in 1909 in Addis43 the House of Lords 
held that damages can only be awarded where contractual notice is not given and that damages may 
not exceed the remuneration payable during the notice period.44  
Kahn-Freund summarised the nature of the contract of employment in the following terms:45 
In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is condition of subordination, however much 
that submission and subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind 
known as the 'contract of employment'. 
IV STATUTORY INTERVENTIONS 
In the real world of course employees are unimpressed with the ahistorical formalism with 
which the common law surrounds the employment relationship. They use their political influence, 
collectively and individually, to obtain a degree of countervailing power. Employees generally, and 
those who depend on them, make up the majority of the general public and they know when 
employment law is unjust. The political use of that countervailing influence has had significant 
implications for the character of the employment contract created by the common law.  
  
41  Air New Zealand v Raddock [1999] 1 ERNZ 30, 36 (CA) Henry J for the Court.  
42  Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578, 1581 (HL) Lord Reid. 
43  Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 (HL).  
44  For a discussion of the importance of this case see Freedland above n 12, 356 and following. 
45  Khan-Freund, above n 17, 8. 
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Legislative drafters have used the status of "employee" as a gateway to deliver a variety of legal 
rights and obligations which in turn have reshaped the legal architecture of the employment 
relationship. I note in passing, as there is no time to develop this theme, that this legislative 
technique positioned the judiciary as the gatekeepers to such rights. Deciding who is or is not an 
employee has provided decades of amusement for judges and fees for lawyers.46 
There are broadly two, albeit overlapping, generations of statutory intervention.  
The first generation created a statutory floor of employment rights – the requirement to pay 
wages as money, the minimum wage and guaranteed public and annual holidays.47 More recently 
this has extended to specific social and human rights – protection against discrimination, the right to 
parental leave48 and the right of freedom of association and to bargain collectively.49 These first 
generation interventions did not however significantly impinge on the managerial prerogatives and 
powers conceded by the common law and I will not discuss them further. 
Second generation interventions however go directly to the heart of so-called management 
prerogatives and the claimed right of an employing entity "to run its business as it thinks fit".50 
Such interventions are typified by unfair dismissal laws. 
 
Something of the traditional common law spirit remains however. Legislation is interpreted by 
courts who may be less than sympathetic to the aims of the reform. Indeed periodic skirmishes 
between courts and legislatures over the direction of the law seems to be a defining characteristic of 
labour law in most common law jurisdictions. It is a factor that should strongly focus the legislative 
mind.51 
 
46  For a discussion of the complexity and volume of the case law see Mazengarb above n 8, paras ERA6.2- 
ERA6.19. 
47  Wages Protection Act 1983 [1891], Minimum Wage Act 1983 [1936], Holidays Act 2003 [1910]. The dates 
in square brackets in this and the following note are the year legislation on that subject was first enacted. 
Some additional protections were afforded through the arbitration system, for example the presumption of a 
5 day, 40 hour week (Labour Relations Act 1987, s 172). 
48  Human Rights Act 1993 [1971], Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 [1980]. 
49  The legal right to organise in unions has existed since 1878 (Trade Unions Act) but the right to bargain 
collectively in its modern sense evolved more slowly out of the arbitration system. A clear statutory right to 
strike was first enacted in the Labour Relations Act 1987, s 233. 
50  Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin [1998] 1 ERNZ 601, 618 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
51  Compare the majority and dissenting judgments in Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2001] 1 ERNZ 660 (CA) for 
an example of this. 
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A Second Generation Interventions 
For the final part of this lecture I turn to the two major second generation legislative 
developments constraining an employing entity's unilateral decision making power. The first was 
the personal grievance procedures introduced in 1973 and extended to cover all employees in 
1991.52 The second is the duty of good faith which forms a fundamental plank of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000.  
1 Personal grievances 
To turn first to personal grievances. Their most fundamental feature is that they require an 
employing entity to justify a decision to dismiss an employee. It is not for the employee to 
demonstrate that the employer lacked justification. The employer has a positive obligation to 
demonstrate both substantive reasons for the dismissal and that it was carried out in a manner that 
accords with natural justice. Moreover if a dismissal is found to be unjustified the employer will be 
liable to pay compensation for lost remuneration, for other economic loss and for the humiliation 
and loss of dignity caused to the employee.  
Personal grievance rights displace the common law assumptions that an employer is the sole 
judge of whether or not to dismiss an employee and that the employer cannot be liable for the 
financial consequences that a dismissal may visit on the employee.  
These rights represent a fundamental shift in attitudes to employment. An employee is no longer 
a commodity but a person who has the right to fair treatment, a person who should not be deprived 
of their economic security and the investment in their employment without justifiable reasons and 
then only if the principles of natural justice are observed. 
However effective protection is dependent on two factors – the standard of justification and the 
effectiveness of the remedies available. Both have proved to be contentious since 1991. The 
retention of personal grievance rights in 1991 was particularly controversial. New Right lobby 
groups had demanded their repeal. This disappointment manifested itself in a vehement, sustained 
and wholly unjustifiable attack on the Employment Court judges, alleging they were pro-
employee.53 Despite the best efforts of the New Right, and detailed analysis of the Court's 
decisions, no evidence was produced to justify these assertions.54  
  
52  For a discussion of the origins of the procedures see Gordon Anderson "The Origins and Development of 
the Personal Grievance Procedure in New Zealand" (1988) 13 NZJIR 257. 
53  See Gordon Anderson "The Judiciary, the Court and Appeals" [1993] ELB 90 and "Politics, the Judiciary 
and the Court – Again" [1995] ELB 2. 
54  See for example the Treasury commissioned study: J Hodder and J Foster The Employment Contracts Act: 
The Judicial Influence 1991-1997 (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1998) and my review of that 
book in [1999] ELB 46. 
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This attack may, nevertheless, have had the desired effect in influencing the judicial climate. 
During the 1990s the Court of Appeal took an increasingly conservative approach to the law. Even 
though the substantive provisions were largely untouched, the Court, in Aoraki, opined that "the 
context in which they operate is sharply changed by the emphasis in the 1991 Act on contractual 
freedom."55 Before that point the test of justification had been largely objective with the employer's 
decision reviewed against a notional reasonable employer who had taken account of all relevant 
matters including the position of the employee.  
The Court shifted this focus to give greater weight to the employer perspective, making it 
essentially a more subjective test.56 It held it was not the function of the courts to substitute their 
view for that of the employer. It also allowed employers considerable discretionary latitude. If 
dismissal fell within a broad range of responses open to the employer the dismissal was justified 
even if a court, essentially the neutral observer, might regard it as unduly harsh. 
As Paul Roth has pointed out, the problem with such a one-sided approach is that it uses as the 
measure of fairness the perspective of the class of persons whose conduct the legislation was 
intended to regulate.57 Effective protection requires that the employer is not the judge of the 
reasonableness of its own actions. Those actions must be tested in a neutral forum against an 
objective standard. 
This reactionary trend was reversed by section 103A of the Employment Relations Act. 
Justification is again determined on an objective basis, by considering whether the employer's 
actions were what a fair and reasonable employer would have done in all the circumstances. Judge 
Shaw has summarised its effect as restoring to the courts "the duty of inquiry and the right of 
judgment".58 She added:59 
It may mean that the Court reaches a different conclusion from that of the employer but, provided this is 
done appropriately, that is objectively and with regard to all the circumstances at the time the dismissal 
occurred, a conclusion different from that of the employer may be a proper outcome. 
  
55  Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin, above n 50, 612 Judgment of the Court. 
56  For an account of the evolution of the test see Mazengarb above n 8, paras ERA103A.6-ERA103A.7. 
57  Paul Roth "The Poverty of Fairness in Employment Law" [2001] ELB 85 
58  Air New Zealand Ltd v Hudson [2006] 3 NZELR 155, para 120 (EC) Judge Shaw. 
59  Ibid. 
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I noted above that effective protection requires effective remedies. The Court of Appeal has also 
kept a firm hand on the quantum of compensation. This has not been without criticism and a case 
can be made that compensation might be considerably more generous.60 
2 The duty of good faith 
The second important legislative development is of the duty of good faith introduced in 2000.61 
This duty potentially it goes to the heart of the individual employment relationship and to 
management prerogative.  
It requires the parties to an employment relationship to "be active and constructive in 
establishing and maintaining a productive employment relationship in … which the parties are 
responsive and communicative." It applies to "any matter arising in relation to an individual 
employment agreement".62 It permeates all aspects of every employment relationship. 
For individual employees the most obvious requirement is that they be consulted on business 
proposals that might impact on their future employment. This requirement overrules a line Court of 
Appeal decisions holding that an employer was not obligated to consult employees on commercial 
decisions – only to implement them in a fair manner. In Aoraki the Court stated: "To impose [a] 
requirement of that kind would be inconsistent with the employer's prima facie right to organise and 
run its business operation as it sees fit."63 
The new duty to consult was not received enthusiastically by that Court, the majority resisting 
submissions that the Act required a re-evaluation of the law. It required the recasting of the 
provisions in 2004 to make the intended changes unequivocally clear.64 
Consult is not merely a synonym for "tell".65 Employers must involve employees during the 
development of a proposal, provide relevant information, allow sufficient time for a developed 
response, and properly consider that response. Failure to consult carries significant legal risk. The 
courts may delay the implementation of redundancies until proper consultation has occurred. If a 
dismissal is challenged failure to consult may lead to substantial compensation being awarded and 
  
60  See further Gordon Anderson "Reimbursement and Compensation for Unjustified Dismissal" (2006) 12 
NZBLQ 230, 249-251. 
61  See generally Gordon Anderson "Transplanting and Growing Good Faith in New Zealand Labour Law" 
(2006) AJLL 1. 
62  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 4. 
63  Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin, above n 50, 618, judgment of the Court. 
64  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 4(1A) inserted by s 5(1) of the Employment Relations Amendment Act 
2004. 
65  Simpsons Farms Ltd v Aberhart [2006] 4 NZELR 170, paras 59-63 (EC) Chief Judge Colgan. 
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throw doubt on the genuineness of the decision. The Employment Court has made it clear that a 
failure to consult will vitiate the dismissal. A fair and reasonable employer, held Chief Judge 
Colgan, is one that complies with its legal obligations.66 The employer remains free to make the 
final decision but its employees are entitled to a be properly heard as such decisions may impact on 
their employment security.  
As I have already described, the common law expects a very high standard of conduct from 
employees, and indeed the statutory duty of good faith confirms and reinforces this expectation. In 
the case of employers the law has been somewhat more flexible. The second issue I would like to 
consider is whether the duty of good faith affects the standard of conduct expected of employers. In 
1992 the Court of Appeal held that the implied term of fair treatment does not require an employer 
to conform at all times to the highest standards of good management practice.67 The Court 
commented that this "would be an unlikely obligation for any employer to accept, and it is certainly 
not one which could be implied into terms of employment." The Court conceded there was "much 
good sense" in expert evidence on good practice and noted an increasing awareness of such matters.  
I suggest that the duty of good faith, especially as it was reformulated in 2004, requires the 
courts to take a more proactive approach and to require employers to act in accordance with at least 
contemporary standards of good management practice and in some cases with best standards. I 
further suggest that many of the more intractable problems being identified in the modern workplace 
can only be dealt with by requiring such a standard. Managing the negative consequences of the new 
"flexible" workplace – excessive workloads, the psychological and physical consequences of stress 
and workplace bullying – requires high standards of management competence. The failure to 
effectively manage such issues poses a significant risk to employees and considerable legal risk for 
employers. Cases involving serious stress affecting an employee's long term employability have 
resulted in very high levels of damages.68 
Good, and where appropriate best, management practice is now both a realistic expectation and 
an achievable standard The legal risk associated with personal grievances including discrimination 
and sexual harassment has required employers to be proactive in minimising risks. Arguably the 
most important benefit of such risk was the development of robust employment practices and 
standards by experts such as organisational psychologists and human resource practitioners. 
Properly used these provide important protections for both employers and employees.69 They are 
not perfect, and not always used appropriately, but they do exist. Problems such as poor 
  
66  Ibid, para 65 Chief Judge Colgan. 
67  Anderson v Attorney-General (23 October 1992) CA 292/91. 
68  Attorney-General v Gilbert [2002] 2 NZLR 342 (CA). 
69  See further Gordon Anderson and Jane Bryson "Developing the Statutory Obligation of Good Faith in 
Employment Law: What Might Human Resource Management Contribute?" (2006) 37 VUWLR 487. 
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performance, misconduct and harassment are increasingly managed through processes designed to 
protect the interests of all parties. 
These standards provide a solid foundation of theory and practice from which the courts might 
derive standards and expectations of good management practice. Equally importantly the courts 
should expect employers to be aware of good employment practice and to implement it. The 
Employment Court once commented: "This is a case about process and who controls it. It well 
illustrates the aphorism that procedure is power in employment relations". It noted the significant 
advantages an employer possesses through its control of process which the Court said is "the 
practical manifestation of 'the inherent inequality of bargaining power in employment relationships'" 
that is referred to in the objectives of the Employment Relations Act.70  
This argument applies equally to employer control of human resources management processes. 
The statutory requirement that the parties be active and constructive in maintaining a good faith 
relationship reinforces arguments for the more active judicial review of management practices 
impacting on employees.  
X  CONCLUSION 
Collins commented that contemporary law "represents 200 years of the evolution of pragmatic 
attempts to balance the logic of the market system with the liberal aspiration to ensure that 
individuals are treated with respect and justly, and that they have the opportunity to construct 
meaningful lives."71 
I return to the question posed at the commencement of this lecture – does current law adequately 
protect the legitimate expectations of employees in an era of individual employment? I suggest that 
the answer is a qualified yes. Yes to the extent that is possible and defensible in the context of 
contemporary New Zealand society and politics. Yes for the majority of workers in most situations. 
The two generations of statutory intervention I referred to provide an acceptable balance to the 
employer powers entrenched in the contract of employment and to the power of employers to 
dominate the express terms of such contracts. They provide the levers for governments and the 
courts to balance the conflicting interests of employers and employees while ensuring that the 
mutual benefits of their interaction are not lost. Both the personal grievance provisions and the duty 
of good faith are flexible and able to be applied in a common sense manner by an Authority and a 
Court that have a depth of experience in workplace relations. As always the courts must be prepared 
to use the available levers and in doing so they need to be fully mindful that employment 
relationships involve two parties, something that they do not always do. 
  
70  New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd 
[2002] 1 ERNZ 597, para 3 (EC) Judge Colgan. 
71  Collins, above n 11, 5. 
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The Employment Relations Act restored balance to the test of justification and the duty of good 
faith, a flexible and workable litmus test by which workplace behaviours can be evaluated. That Act 
provided New Zealand with perhaps the most flexible and non-bureaucratic employment law in the 
developed world – in spite of continuing claims that the Act is "employer-unfriendly" and "punishes 
business".  
Margaret Wilson has commented that while legislation cannot change individual values or 
beliefs it can influence and change behaviours.72 But behaviours may lead to changed values if the 
benefit of change is clear. And the need for co-operative and productive workplace relations, 
supported by adequate legal rights protecting all stakeholders, should be obvious to and supported 
by all reasonable employers and employees.  
I concluded the answer to my question was a qualified yes. The final point I would make is that 
this is not the case for all workers in all situations. Many workers, and particularly the most 
vulnerable, need more effective protection. Further legislative reform may improve their situation 
but there are limits to what can be achieved by statute. What is also needed is adequate enforcement 
of existing rights. 
The most effective protection for employees is, and always has been, through collective 
organisation. Collective representation provides the strength for employees to influence their terms 
of employment, the strength to ensure some joint management of the relationship day to day, and 
most importantly the resources to effectively their enforce their rights. 
But that is another lecture for another day. 
 
 
72  Margaret Wilson "The Employment Relations Act: A Framework for a Fairer Way" in E Rasmussen (ed) 
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